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**THE ROLE OF THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD IN ONGOING
OVERSEAS PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS: HOW FAR DO WE
STRETCH THE RUBBER BAND BEFORE IT BREAKS?**

BY

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: LTC Robert S. Forbes

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The downsizing of active military forces and the concurrent spike in operational tempo has resulted in a greatly increased use of Army National Guard units in ongoing overseas peacekeeping missions. The purpose of this paper is to see what impacts this situation is having on the Army National Guard and what actions should be taken to minimize the negative aspects of these deployments while fully supporting the nation's requirements. The paper covers three key areas. First, there is a review of the historical background on how the Army and the Army National Guard got to this point. Second, an analysis of the current actions being taken is made to see what impacts this policy is having on the Army National Guard. Finally, based on the projections for the future use of the Army National Guard, recommendations are made for the future direction of this policy.

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THE ROLE OF THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD IN ONGOING OVERSEAS PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS: HOW FAR DO WE STRETCH THE RUBBER BAND BEFORE IT BREAKS?

"The future Army must be a Total Force, trained and ready to fight, serving our nation at home and abroad; we must be a strategic force capable of decisive victory."

— General Gordon R. Sullivan,
former Army Chief of Staff

"The Army" is truly becoming a reality, as active duty forces work hand-in-hand with the National Guard and Reserves to support the multitude of peacekeeping missions it has been tasked to perform. Force downsizing and budget reductions, combined with a great increase in ongoing missions have essentially forced the Regular Army to rely on its Reserve Components to assist in the conduct of these operations. The Army National Guard has been a willing partner and has greatly increased its participation in the past ten years in supporting overseas deployments. This paper reviews the past history which brought us to this state, makes an analysis of our current situation and its impacts on the Army National Guard, gives a projection of future operations, and forwards recommendations for the future that would reduce the negative impacts on the Army National Guard while still fully supporting today's missions. Although all reserve components are involved in peacekeeping operations, this paper addresses only the Army National Guard.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

THE EVOLUTION OF THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

The Army National Guard has always had a unique role in America's defense, with two distinct missions and two chains of command. Guardsmen report to the governor of their state during normal peacetime operations and during state emergencies, but when federalized they fall under the National Command Authority to support federal missions.¹ The origin of the Army National Guard and its dual role can be traced back to Section 8 of Article I of the Constitution of the United States: "Congress shall have the power to provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions (Clause 15) and to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively,

the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress (Clause 16)." ²

During the early part of this country's history, little influence from Washington, DC, was placed on the militia (later the Army National Guard) due to its dual nature and peacetime control by each state's governor. The militia was completely separated from the Regular Army, except during periods of summer training and in time of war. The relationship between the two organizations was often divisive due to political, budgetary, and personal factors. This began to change in the 1930's as Congress passed an act creating the National Guard Bureau, thus establishing the current system known today.³

The Army National Guard performed well during World War II and Korea, but by the 1960's the Guard was viewed as just another place to go to avoid being drafted for Vietnam rather than a viable military organization that could deploy if needed. There was a deliberate decision during the Vietnam War to avoid calling up the Army National Guard, mainly due to the fear of political backlash from the disruption it would cause to the country and the quality of the Army National Guard at that time. In the late 1960's, realizing that the lack of public support for the war effort was partly due to the failure to involve the National Guard, General Creighton W. Abrams stated that "The United States should never again undertake a war of significant proportions without calling the National Guard and Reserve" and that "It was only with this commitment from grass roots America that public opinion and support can be solidified."⁴

In 1970, General Abrams presented his Total Force concept of integrating the Regular Army and the Reserve Components more effectively and the concept was formally adopted as national security policy in 1973. The two main tenants were to plan for the integration of all forces available, including active forces, reserves, civilians, and allies, and to use the reserves as the primary augmentation for the active forces. The driving forces behind this concept were the experiences of the U.S. in Vietnam, the end of the draft, and the decline in defense budgets. One key objective of this new policy was to rebuild the community ties with the public and reestablish the confidence of the American people in the military.⁵

As the policy began to be implemented, many Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) functions were moved into the Army Reserve and Army National Guard. The end result of this reorganization was that the Regular Army would be unable to make major deployments without calling up some reserve units to support the mission.⁶

Another program to come out of the 1970's was the CAPSTONE program, the first serious attempt at matching National Guard and Reserve forces with active component parent organizations based on planned wartime missions. Army National Guard units were aligned with Regular Army higher headquarters and given specific wartime missions. Also established during this period was the Round Out/Round Up program. Some Regular Army divisions contained only two active brigades, with the third "Round Out" brigade an Army National Guard or Reserve brigade. In all, seven of the active divisions contained two Regular Army brigades and one National Guard or Reserve "Round Out" brigade by the end of the 1970's. Additional Army National Guard or Reserve brigades were designated to be "Round Up" brigades, providing a fourth brigade to some of the active divisions.⁷

Military defense spending was greatly increased after Ronald Reagan became president in 1981 and the Army National Guard began to see some of the benefits. New and improved weaponry and equipment began to flow into units and there was more money for schools and professional education. Standards were raised and the quality of the Army National Guard began to improve greatly. Army National Guard units began to participate more actively in overseas deployments and some elements were activated during a number of operations such as the 1986 Libya operation, Honduras in 1988, and in Operation Just Cause in Panama in 1989.⁸

The real turning point in Regular Army-Army National Guard cooperation occurred during Desert Shield and Desert Storm. In August 1990, President George Bush invoked (for the first time in this nation's history) the authority under section 673 (b), Title 10, to call 200,000 members of the National Guard and Reserve to active duty for up to 180 days.⁹ This marked the first time since 1968 (when approximately 26,000 Guardsmen and Reservists were activated to provide government support during the New York City postal strike) that reservists were involuntarily mobilized.¹⁰ The Army deployed a total of 23 ARNG colonel-level and 37 ARNG lieutenant colonel-level commands to CENTCOM's area of operation in support of Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Two of the colonel-level commands were Artillery brigades, both of which deployed within 45 days of mobilization and actively participated in the fight.¹¹ A total of 395 Army National Guard units were placed in federal service and 297 of those units served directly in the Persian Gulf area of operations.¹² One portion of the Army National Guard that did not participate was the Round Out brigades. These "Round Out" brigades were not

mobilized and deployed with their parent divisions and only three Army National Guard brigades were even mobilized, none of which saw service in the war zone.¹³

The initial post-conflict reviews of the performance of the National Guard and Reserves led to the scrapping of the CAPSTONE and the round out/round up programs. Instead of a direct relationship between Army National Guard brigades and Regular Army divisions, the 1993 Bottom-Up Review recommended the formation of ARNG enhanced brigades, which were designed to provide early combat deployment capability.¹⁴ The Enhanced Brigade concept was adopted by the Pentagon in 1994 and fifteen Army National Guard brigades around the country were designated to be "enhanced brigades" which were to receive a higher level of funding and the latest in military equipment and weapons. Modeled after the old "round out" concept, these brigades were a hedge against two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRC), prepared to follow active duty forces into battle.¹⁵ Based on the realities of lift capabilities and timelines for mobilization, these forces could possibly deploy to fight in either MRC; although it was more likely that they would be used in the second MRC.¹⁶ Thus, these enhanced brigades became the Army's primary warfighting reserve force. The CAPSTONE program, however, was not replaced and many Army National Guard units, particularly the combat divisions, no longer had any specific assigned wartime mission or direct relationship with a Regular Army headquarters.

Because of concerns with the time limitation of 180 days for mobilization of Reserve Component forces, the involuntary call-up period was extended to 270 days in 1994's Defense Authorization Act.¹⁷ With a Presidential declaration of national emergency, up to 1,000,000 Reserve soldiers could be mobilized, however, full mobilization would still require a Congressional declaration of war.¹⁸ This extended period of 270 days made Army National Guard units even more viable for peacetime overseas deployments. The extra 90 days allowed more pre-deployment training and post-deployment recovery time while still enabling the unit to perform a six month rotation overseas.

The 1994 Active/Reserve Off-site Agreement was another major milestone in the reshaping of the Reserve Component mix. In this agreement, the Army National Guard picked up the vast majority of the combat units, while the Army Reserve converted to combat support and service support units.¹⁹ Guard and Reserve end strengths were established. The Army National Guard was aligned as a smaller, balanced land force with combat, CS, and CSS

capabilities for both wartime and domestic missions. The Army Reserve was aligned with its core competencies - combat service support, with some combat support and specialized units.²⁰

Another reshaping event of the 1990's was the Army Division Redesign Study, which developed out of the 1995 Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces. According to current and future needs there was a shortfall in CS and CSS capabilities and an excess of combat forces. Consequently, the commission recommended a realignment of the Army National Guard divisions, with some converting to CS and CSS units and eight combat divisions retaining warfighting missions.²¹ The end result of this reshaping was a better focus by each component and an increased level of needed capability of CS and CSS elements. These organizations could be called up by the Army with less difficulty in order to fill critical support shortfalls in the Regular Army structure particularly for ongoing peacekeeping operations.

The 1995 Sinai Peninsula rotation was another landmark for AC/RC integration. For first time in the 12 year history of the mission, the multinational force and observer (MFO) mission on the Sinai Peninsula consisted of both active and reserve soldiers. Formed in 1994, this task force deployed to the Sinai in January 1995 for a six-month rotation. Volunteers from the Army National Guard made up almost 75 percent of the battalion, including almost half its leadership.²² There was a total of 383 ARNG soldiers from 24 states deployed as part of the 82nd Airborne Division's 4th Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment.²³ Though a success in terms of AC-RC integration, one failing of this rotation was the unit was a composite one rather than an organic unit with unit integrity and cohesion. This lessened the quality of the pre-deployment training and reduced the post-deployment benefits to the organizations involved.

The deployment pace for the Army National Guard picked up as the military found itself involved in the Bosnia mission and later in Kosovo. Beginning on December 14, 1995, the ARNG mobilized over 2,000 troops in fifty-three units from 28 states for the initial Bosnia mission. Through 1999, the ARNG sent 8,530 soldiers to Europe and the Balkans as peace keepers.²⁴ FY 1999 also saw a continued fast pace of deployments throughout the world with over 32,700 Army National Guard soldiers deployed in Overseas Deployment for Training (ODT) in support of regional CINC headquarters. The fiscal year 2000 totals, though not final, will probably approach or exceed the record amounts of 1999.

Currently more than 2000 Army National Guard soldiers are supporting the U.S. Stabilization Force (SFOR) in the Balkans in OPERATION JOINT GUARDIAN (Kosovo) and OPERATION JOINT FORGE (Bosnia). On March 7, 2000, the 49th Armored Division headquarters from Texas took over the command responsibilities for the American sector in Bosnia, becoming the Command and Control element for the American and Allied forces serving in the Multi-National Division - North.²⁵ This was the first ARNG division headquarters to deploy to Europe on an operational mission in almost fifty years.²⁶

THE REGULAR ARMY IN THE 1990'S

As the National Guard and Reserve forces have evolved in the changing environment of the 1990's, so too have the active forces. The end of the Cold War meant great changes to the Regular Army structure. Begun prior to Desert Storm, the decrease in forces due to the elimination of the threat from the USSR continued throughout the early part of the decade. Combat forces were reduced to ten divisions by 1993 and total end strength also decreased significantly. At the same time, the mission load increased at a significant rate. Though the Army's active and reserve forces had shrunk by over 40 percent since 1989 when the Soviet Union fell apart, the number of Army deployments grew by over 300 percent.²⁷ From 1945 to 1989 during the Cold War, there were only 13 peacekeeping operations. Since 1989, 26 new operations have been sanctioned by the United Nations, of which the U.S. Army has participated in sixteen.²⁸ Compounding this situation is the fact that many of these new missions are open-ended, with no completion date in sight.

Regular Army personnel tempo has also steadily increased in the past decade. In 1997, soldiers averaged approximately 139 days deployed across the operating force and many units exceeded 180 days. Due to his concern with the adverse effects of this pace of operations on the quality of life of the soldiers, the Army Chief of Staff directed that all commanders attempt to reduce the tempo to under 120 days. This meant reducing training by 10% and cutting National Training Center rotations from twelve to ten per year. Decreases in operations certainly benefit Army families, but come at the price of desired unit readiness and decreased levels of training.²⁹ The Regular Army, therefore, was faced with the problem of trying to balance increasing mission requirements against the quality of life of its families.

The Army also began to be affected by the changing nature of the new members of the active force in the 1990's. The perspective of the junior officers and enlisted men began to change as the Generation X'ers began replacing the Baby Boomers in the ranks, resulting in somewhat of a culture clash between generations. The new soldiers were less willing to sacrifice their personal lives for the sake of the mission and were more concerned with the impacts of deployments on their families. Also, the percentage of married soldiers increased. This came at a time where there were fewer stable overseas assignments like three-year accompanied tours in Germany and other relatively comfortable locations. The deployments instead were unaccompanied tours to less hospitable locations such as Saudi Arabia and the Balkans, further increasing the stress on Army family life and furthering the impact on retention.³⁰

Retention has become a critical issue in the Regular Army as mid-level officers are leaving the service at a higher rate than normal. Many cite the increased impact of deployments on their families as a reason for leaving.³¹ The consequences of this pressure on Army families and the related retention concerns are additional factors which have increased the incentive to rely on the reserve components to support the current peacekeeping missions.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff conducted a study in January 1995 to assess the effects of a peacekeeping mission such as the Sinai mission on the Army. They found that assignment of an ongoing mission to a battalion-sized task force effectively reduced the Army's combat-ready force by a brigade and that the ripples were felt in an even greater number of units. This triple effect was due to the fact that three battalions were involved in the effort - the unit preparing for the operation which had to switch from warfighting to peacekeeping training, the unit on the ground conducting the mission, and the unit immediately redeployed. The returning unit often was dramatically impacted because not only did it have to retrain on the combat skills that had atrophied during the rotation but it also had to handle a higher level of turnover that had previously been frozen due to the rotation. The personnel problem was often compounded as the returning unit was dropped in relative priority level in favor of another unit that was preparing to go. The U.S. General Accounting Office reported that it took up to six months for a combat unit to recover from a peacekeeping operation and again reach combat readiness.³²

This triple effect was less noticeable when the Army was at a strength of 18 divisions and overseas missions were much less frequent. Now the impact is much more significant with

only 10 divisions available and a greater mission level. The Army still has essentially the same "fixed" units in Korea, Hawaii, Alaska, and some other forward locations as before the downsizing that are not readily available for peacekeeping operations. It also must still maintain units such as the 82nd Airborne Division and the 101st Airmobile Division in the Rapid Reaction Force that are used for immediate deployment into a crisis area and cannot be fully used for ongoing peacekeeping missions. After taking these units out of the equation, the amount of "slack" in the system is now far less and the units available for peacekeeping operations are being tasked at a much higher rate than ever before.

The end result of this combination of downsizing, increase in missions, and greater impact on the units and soldiers throughout the 1990's is that the demands and pressures on the active component have significantly increased over the past decade. Army National Guard and Army Reserve have become more and more critical in providing assets to reduce the demands on the Regular Army and assist the active force in fulfilling all its mission requirements. With approximately 54% of the Army now in the reserve component, it has now become routine for the Army to call upon the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard to help carry out the National Military Strategy.³³

THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD IN CURRENT OPERATIONS

In 2001, the Army National Guard continues to play an active role in overseas deployments. Elements of the 29th Division (Virginia Army National Guard) and the 28th Infantry Division (Pennsylvania Army National Guard) are currently scheduled to deploy to the Balkans.³⁴ Additionally, on 4 December 2000, the Army announced an updated Balkans rotation schedule for the next several years. Approved by General Eric K. Shinseki, Army Chief of Staff, this schedule identifies the units and dates of six month rotations for the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia (SFOR 9 through 16) and the Kosovo Force (KFOR). Included on the list for the SFOR mission are many National Guard units, with Army National Guard division headquarters placed in charge of six of the next eight Bosnia rotations.

Some of the fifteen enhanced brigades are also being tapped to provide assets for SFOR rotations 9-12 and possibly for 13-16 as well.³⁵ Though it is too early to tell whether the new administration will make significant changes in the U.S.'s role in the Balkans, right now it

appears very likely that the Army National Guard will be playing a major role in that area for many years. Other deployments throughout the world are also on the same pace as in 2000, and are expected to continue at that level in the future.

CURRENT IMPACTS TO THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

The most critical resource for a member of the Army National Guard is time. Unlike an officer or soldier in the Regular Army who has 365 days a year to conduct business, train, and deploy, the National Guardsman is faced with very limited time available to accomplish the Army National Guard's mission and still have a civilian career and family life. There are three critical relationships each traditional Army National Guardsman has to maintain with the time available: family, employer, and the Guard. A delicate balance must be made in each relationship for the Guardsman to be successful in all three areas. MG (Retired) Gerald T. Sajer, former Adjutant General of the State of Pennsylvania, likens these critical relationships to attending three parking meters. Staying too long at any one of the three can adversely affect the other two and feeding too many coins into one will result in a ticket from one of the others.³⁶

For family members, deployments have the impact of potentially causing a great imbalance in family relationships. As the pace of overseas missions has increased in recent years, the potential for problems has become more pronounced. At the same time, the Army National Guard has greater challenges to face than does the Regular Army in supporting family and employers. The National Guard lacks the same robust family support network found on an Regular Army post. Generally, Guardsmen from a unit are scattered over a wide geographic area and support services are often hundreds of miles away. Many spouses and family members are not even aware of their benefits when the reservist member of the family is called up. Sometimes military medical treatment facilities are far away, if even available, and TRICARE is a complex system that is often difficult to use.³⁷ Thus, an overseas deployment can have even a greater impact on the Guard family than that felt by a Regular Army family. Additionally, family relationships can be greatly impacted by an increased Guard workload or deployments, just as with long hours at the office. Most spouses are supportive to an extent, but not to the exclusion of all the family time. There is often concern among many spouses that the Army National Guard is a part-time job and should not turn into a full-time one.³⁸

Deployments affect the civilian employment of soldiers in the Army National Guard in various ways. There is a portion of the Guard population which has flexible employment, either having a large employer with formal leave of absence procedures or being in a field where skills are easily transferable to other companies. A government employee, for example, usually is better able to take time off and a carpenter has a relatively easy time finding a job with another construction company if his old job is gone. More significantly impacted are those soldiers who are self-employed, are employed in small businesses, or are professionals with private practices. Self-employed soldiers, particularly those with small operations can have their business wiped out if deployed for a lengthy period. For example, a plumber with a business in a small town could lose his customers quickly if he is not available for a period of six to nine months. It can take months for these individuals to rebuild their client base and regain a flow of steady work. Employees in small businesses often lose their jobs, despite all the legal protections, as the small business cannot afford to hold the spot open for any length of time. Likewise, a professional in the medical or other high paying field will often suffer a significant monetary impact while on active duty and sometimes will see a negative impact on his or her practice if that professional is not there to keep it going.

Employer support of the Army National Guard for the most part has been very positive in the recent past. Guardsmen and Reservists who deployed to Desert Shield and Desert Storm, in general received excellent treatment by employers around the country. The same level of support is generally seen from employers with favorable response to mobilizations during state emergencies where there is a true need and definite state interest. Employers can easily relate to the situation when the local television is carrying breaking news of the fire, flood, or other emergency. is generally in direct proportion to their significance. Employers will fully support a mission where there is a clear national or local interest and a definite need for the National Guard to participate.

Such is not always the case, however, during ongoing peacekeeping operations. It is a more difficult sell when the mission has dropped off the nightly news. Employers start asking two tough questions: "Why isn't the Active Army able to do that?" and "Why are you going overseas for training when you are in this state's Guard?". This employer resistance, though very difficult to quantify, is one of the challenges today's Guardsman has to face.

The third critical relationship is that with the Guard itself. Over the past twenty years, civilian and military education requirements have been gradually increased and now essentially match the Regular Army's standards. Guard officers can no longer make colonel without a college degree and only minimal officer education. A colonel now must have completed the Army War College or its equivalent, either through correspondence or in resident status, to be eligible for promotion to general officer. These increased standards have had a significant impact in raising the overall quality of Army National Guard officers and soldiers but they have also added to the time commitment required for each Guardsman as well. Usually, officers and senior enlisted personnel in troop units attend schooling in addition to unit drills and complete all correspondence requirements on their own time.

The time commitment of a Guardsman to the Army National Guard also increases greatly when his unit is scheduled to deploy. It is impossible to get ready for an NTC rotation or an overseas deployment in only 39 days a year, the normal time allotted for training. A large amount of additional time is required for meetings, classes, and other additional training events. Leaders in particular see their time commitment increase significantly. Using General Sajer's analogy, a Guardsman preparing for or going on a deployment is putting an awful lot of coins in one parking meter and neglecting the other two. Consequently, there is a very definite risk of getting a ticket somewhere during this process.³⁹

One other factor that must be considered is that the ability of a National Guard unit to recover from a deployment is much slower than that of an active unit. A significant deployment generally "breaks" a unit for a period of time due to the turnover in leadership and soldiers after their return. The new team often needs to almost start again with the basics in some cases. Due to the time constraints with normal training, it takes years (as many as four or five) for a unit to reconstitute to a similar manning and training level as before it was deployed unless the deployment mission is similar to the full wartime mission. This again puts stress on the leaders of the organization, particularly if the same unit is designated to redeploy more frequently than a four to five year cycle.⁴⁰

Overall, the higher level of overseas commitments have increasingly stressed the fabric of the Army National Guard. Though the units that return from deployments are generally coming back with high morale and great enthusiasm, that high level of training and motivation often fades rapidly when faced with the realities of family life and current employment. These

are very real impacts that are having negative effects on the Army National Guard. Changes in policies and procedures in order to help preserve the force need to be addressed.

FUTURE PROJECTIONS FOR USE OF THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

At the dawn of the 21st Century, the United States will likely remain the world's only superpower. With the lack of an immediate threat and the changing nature of military involvement in crisis situations, there is great uncertainty regarding the Army's role in future military operations. General Shinseki recently initiated the Army Transformation program, where the Army is departing from its current way of doing business to become lighter, faster, and more mobile, able to deploy more rapidly throughout the world. One of General Shinseki's objectives is to streamline the Regular Army so it can put five divisions on the ground in any crisis spot worldwide within 30 days. Assuming that funding and sufficient lift is available, the Army will be able to rapidly project overwhelming force anywhere in the world.⁴¹ Shinseki's vision is not shared by all members of the military establishment. There is great debate on funding for the transformation, what weapons will be used, and what the end result will be. Still, there is now refreshing dialogue challenging the status quo and shaping the Army's future. The result of this major redirection of effort is in the end a very unclear picture of the future role of the Army.

The Army National Guard faces many of the same challenges as the Regular Army as it also does not presently have a clear direction for the future. There are differences of opinion among the Guard leadership. One portion of the Guard wants to sign up for every mission, regardless of its impact on the soldiers and structure of this part-time organization. Some leaders want to actively and immediately participate in the Army's Transformation while others feel that the Army National Guard should be a heavy reserve force with tanks, Bradleys, and heavy artillery. There are some leaders who are much more leery about the need to become just like the Regular Army, believing that becoming the same as the Active Army will mean that the traditional National Guard with its spirit of part-time service to the nation in times of crisis will cease to exist. It is not clear what view will prevail in the long run or whether some middle-of-the-road compromise will be obtained as the National Guard, like the Regular Army, struggles to redefine itself in the post-Cold War period.⁴²

Certainly, newly-elected President George W. Bush and his administration may make a significant difference in the current direction of the country's national military strategy. However, at present, the country already has been committed in several locations where there is no clear exit strategy or foreseeable end of mission in sight. Unless President Bush makes a unilateral decision to simply pull our forces out of Bosnia and/or Kosovo, a somewhat unlikely action at this time, the Army will continue to serve there. Even with a gradual reduction in forces, the transition period will remain long. There are no major threats on the horizon so the expectation is that the bulk of future operations will be other such peacemaking or peacekeeping missions as those in which the Army is currently participating.

There are a number of other missions that can potentially become significant and may greatly change the dialogue. Intelligence reports and analyses indicate that the most dangerous threat is that of Asymmetrical Warfare - attacks on U.S. vulnerabilities in satellites, communications systems, and computers as well as terrorist attacks in the U.S. using weapons of mass destruction (WMD). There has been a great deal of discussion about "Homeland Defense" and the missions this would entail for the National Guard. Already, ten Civil Support Teams manned by National Guardsmen have been established throughout the country to respond to WMD crises and seventeen more are in the process of being organized. This has the potential of drawing off a number of assets in the Army National Guard and redirecting its focus inward rather than outward. It is too early to see how significant this trend will be and how many Guard assets will be committed to support this mission. Homeland Defense has the potential of increasing mission requirements beyond that already faced with the current pace of overseas deployments and may possibly cause even greater stress to the organization.⁴³

In summary, the future roles of the Regular Army and the Army National Guard are quite unclear. What is certain is that in the next several years, the operational tempo will remain high and peacekeeping operations will be the norm.

RECOMMENDATIONS

POLICY LEVEL CHANGES

The new millennium has brought a change in the country's leadership. President George W. Bush, the new president, has indicated in campaign speeches and early statements

once in office that he does not support being the world's policeman in all cases and wants to be more selective in committing forces. Vice-president Dick Cheney and Secretary of State Colin Powell both have histories of supporting a less engaged National Military Strategy.⁴⁴ This leadership team needs to follow their pronouncements with actions and review each of the country's overseas commitments against its national interests, making the hard choices to support every mission.

There are two ways the national leadership can decrease the current deployment stress on the Army: either increase the "supply" of forces by increasing funding to adequately support these missions or reduce the "demand" by pulling back from some of the current overseas commitments. With current budget priorities focused on domestic issues, the likelihood of the "supply" being increased is not very high. Therefore, to reduce the "demand", each current mission should be reviewed for relevancy and commitment levels should be adjusted based on current requirements. A classic example of a mission that may have outlived its usefulness is the Sinai peacekeeping mission. For twenty years there has been a battalion-sized task force in the Sinai supporting the peace between Israel and Egypt. This mission, and others like it, must be reassessed to see if they are still relevant. If the force requirement cannot be completely eliminated, it should at least be reduced in size. A reduction of military commitments throughout the world would definitely lift some of the current burden on the Regular Army and the Army National Guard.

STRUCTURAL RECOMMENDATIONS

The Army, Reserve, and National Guard structures need to be reviewed and adjusted based on current threat analysis and force requirements and not the legacy of the Cold War. Missions for each component should be assigned according to force availability and cost. Another look similar to previous force alignment efforts must be made since requirements have greatly changed in the past decade. For missions requiring forward-deployed forces or rapidly-deploying CONUS-based forces, the force structure and mission should go to the Active Army. Missions that can be achieved by later deployment dates with combat-ready units should be placed in the Reserve components. Lift capabilities must be taken into account as well. The reality of current lift assets is that an ARNG combat unit as the second echelon in a wartime deployment will not ship before 90 (or more) days, regardless of the readiness posture of the

unit.⁴⁵ A realistic analysis of current and projected lift capabilities must be made to see if the Army can truly meet its deployment schedule. These later deploying Combat and Combat Support units should be placed in the ARNG, with the Combat Service Support missions allocated to the USAR.⁴⁶

If the trend toward ongoing overseas commitments continues as expected, the Regular Army needs to adjust its force structure accordingly and reacquire some of the types of units that are currently in heavy demand during peacekeeping operations. For example, Civil Affairs and Public Affairs units, now found mostly in the Reserves and National Guard, are some of the most frequently deployed of all units in the force structure. The original reason for shifting many of these type units into the Reserve Component was that there was not a lot of demand for them except during a time of war. Circumstances have changed dramatically since that decision was made during the establishment of the Total Force concept in the 1970's. Now no unit deploys to a peacekeeping location without some support from a Civil Affairs detachment. If these Civil Affairs and related units are going to be in constant use, it only makes sense to increase the amount in the Regular Army force structure rather than continually calling up Reserve forces.

National Guard units are much more cost effective than those in the active force. Overall, the cost of the ARNG divisions was only around \$1.1 billion per year as of 1997. This represents less than 2% of the Army's budget and less than 0.3% of the full Defense budget.⁴⁷ "The Department of Defense's Total Force Policy Study and the Congressional Budget Office estimated that ARNG units cost 25 to 33 percent of the cost of similar active component units," according to Maj. Gen. William A. Navas, Jr., former director of the Army National Guard.⁴⁸ The largest part of the savings is in the personnel account, with some savings generated due to less frequent training time resulting in lower maintenance and operations expenses. Thus, if the need for early deployment is lower and lift not available, it only makes sense to save the money and shift the assets into the ARNG or USAR.

There are significant resources available, currently being overlooked by the Regular Army, in the Army National Guard combat divisions, which produce a much lower impact on the military budget than their active counterparts while providing a large amount of available soldiers and equipment. First, as the Army becomes lighter and more mobile, it makes great sense to place the heavier forces in the Army National Guard as follow-on elements during a conflict. These divisions would be ideal candidates to hold the bulk of the Army's heavy forces,

particularly over the twenty to thirty year period of transition when the current force equipment will still be in use as the Regular Army conducts its transformation. Second, these divisions provide a pool of talent and resources which can be tapped for peacekeeping operations, as is now happening to a small degree.

Major General Walter Pudlowski, Commander of the Pennsylvania Army National Guard's 28th Infantry Division which is preparing to assume command of the Bosnia mission next year, stated in an interview that he felt Army National Guard involvement in peacekeeping operations was a great opportunity and wonderful experience for the soldiers, with this type of mission fitting well with their civilian backgrounds and allowing them to demonstrate their willingness to perform the nation's defense business.⁴⁹

The structural discussion should focus on how many of these divisions are required in their current form to support the war plans regarding two Major Theater Wars (MTW's) and how readily can they be tapped to support ongoing overseas operations. Only after these questions are answered should there be any movement toward realignment or elimination. If there is restructuring or realigning that needs to be done, then there should be consideration of converting existing divisions to "peacekeeping" divisions rather than eliminating them altogether.

There are several ways of accomplishing this restructuring. One proposal that has been introduced is to restructure two existing ARNG divisions into a division with five brigades: military police, military intelligence, engineer, aviation, and combat. The size of the medical and signal assets would be increased and the organization would be augmented with Civil Affairs and Public Affairs assets. The combat brigade, which should consist of a mix of motorized and mechanized units, would be used to provide general security and reaction forces. The MP's would provide an improved patrolling capability, criminal investigation functions, and crowd control. The intelligence brigade should be weighted with human intelligence capabilities and linguists. The engineers would provide expertise for road and airfield construction and improvement and infrastructure repair and development. The aviation brigade would give the division the flexibility to support rapid movement throughout the area and provide sufficient lift to reach remote sites. A division such as this could be tailored to support various peacekeeping missions, with portions mobilized depending on the size of the operation. This type of division could also be used to support rear area operations during a major conflict, being ideally suited to provide security, quick reaction forces, and control of vulnerable rear areas.⁵⁰

Another proposal is to maintain the current divisional structure, but augment it with selected military police, military intelligence, engineer, aviation, medical and signal assets along with an augmentation of Civil Affairs and Public Affairs detachments. MG Pudlowski's opinion was that he did not want a non-standard structure in the ARNG with peacekeeping as its only mission. Augmentation, he felt, would gain the same benefits as the previous proposal while still preserving the combat capabilities of the division.⁵¹

MISSIONING THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

All units of the ARNG must be assigned war fighting missions and assigned to the geographical Combatant Commanders (CINC's). There is some legal basis in this point: the Goldwater-Nichols act can be read to show that this is a legislative mandate. Title 10, United States Code, section 162, states that "the Secretaries shall assign all forces under their jurisdiction to unified and specified combatant commands".⁵² Beyond the legal issues, specific missioning is critical for a number of reasons. First, a wartime mission allows the unit to focus on specific mission essential tasks and guides the overall training, equipping and general activities of that unit. Second, this allows the organization to become more knowledgeable about the terrain and conditions in the potential area of operations and enables it to establish an ongoing relationship with the CINC through exercises and other operations. Finally, this increases the true integration of "The Army" far better than any other current program.⁵³

The Army needs to take a hard look at the missioning of all its units, active and reserve. If a unit cannot be missioned to a specific CINC, then the force structure should be shifted to an area where the need is greater. Currently, there is no specific mission for the eight ARNG combat divisions, though there has been some study and discussion recently about missioning four of the eight. These divisions either need to be assigned specific missions other than the current nebulous "strategic reserve" mission. If there is no viable mission, they should be realigned or eliminated from the force structure. The current situation is not acceptable.⁵⁴ The Army Chief of Staff did announce at the recent NGAUS General Conference in September 2000 that the Guard divisions and enhanced brigades would be teamed with active duty divisions in what he called "corps packaging". This does mean closer relationships between the two

organizations and will give the Guard units more training assistance and focus but it still does not put the National Guard divisions into the nation's war plans.⁵⁵

If the eight ARNG combat divisions were assigned to specific CINC's, they could then be worked into the ongoing operations in that area under the CINC's control. For example, if two divisions were assigned to CENTCOM, they could be tapped to provide forces in Saudi Arabia or the Sinai according to a rotational schedule. Divisions assigned to EUCOM could be tasked to provide forces on an ongoing basis in Bosnia or Kosovo. The same arguments hold true for the fifteen enhanced brigades and the combat support and service support units in the ARNG. The enhanced brigades located in the western part of the U.S. can be targeted toward the Pacific theater of operations while those in the east can be assigned to CENTCOM, SOUTHCOM, or EUCOM. These should be assigned missions only in their own area. Western units should not be tapped for a European mission and brigades in the east, likewise, should not be conducting exercises in the Pacific theater. Some of this structure was emplaced in the Chief of Staff's "corps packaging" announcement, but it needs to be solidified and strengthened. Missioning will allow each CINC staff to gain a clear understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the assigned ARNG forces and utilize these units in a way that would better benefit both.⁵⁶

The CINC's should allow these units to manage the assigned missions with greater discretion than is currently done. MG Pudlowski expressed it succinctly: "Give me the mission and let me figure out how to do it." The first step in improving this situation is to assign the National Guard specific overseas missions and allow it to manage it for the entire duration of the mission. MG Pudlowski felt that given a company-sized mission, his division with fifteen combat arms companies could sustain the operation indefinitely.⁵⁷ An excellent example of this proposal would be to assign one division the company-sized Macedonia mission. It would be up to that division to provide the necessary soldiers on an ongoing basis until the mission was terminated. This would allow the division to establish rotation schedules internally and more adequately balance the workload on each unit. If the division was unable to fill certain positions, it could request assistance from other Army National Guard units assigned to the same CINC. Instead of deployments being one-time shots, they would settle into a routine pattern.

There are several benefits to this method. First, there are a number of soldiers who would be willing to extend their tours, thus providing continuity to the operation. Second, the

major learning curve normally faced by National Guard leaders when preparing for a deployment would level off as the operation became more routine. Finally, by having a single focus, the unit would be able to better marshal its resources in one direction. An added benefit to all of this would be the increased funding to that unit, which would help in training and operations.

Every peacekeeping mission that the National Guard fully assumed would free that many Active Army assets to focus on their wartime mission. It would also smooth a lot of the current turbulence and uncertainty in the Guard at the same time. Both organizations would win. However, MG Pudlowski cautioned that the mission should not become only a "National Guard" operation but should remain under control of the appropriate CINC and must continue to receive the resources necessary to ensure that the mission succeeds.⁵⁸

When an Army National Guard unit is assigned a particular mission, it should have the flexibility to manage its personnel internally based on the individual needs and situations of each soldier. The Army has to break its mindset regarding unit deployments for the duration of the rotation. The current policy is to mobilize an entire unit, send it through a unit training program, and deploy the whole organization for the entire mission, except for emergency returns by individual soldiers.

The Air National Guard, on the other hand, has the right idea regarding personnel management during deployments. It manages its pilots and airmen individually, tailoring deployment schedules according to the needs of the particular Guardsman as much as possible. Col. (Ret) E. Thomas Kuhn, former commander of the 193rd Special Operations Group, the most deployed organization in the National Guard, said that a great deal of his unit's success was due to this flexible deployment personnel management. He stated that by working with each unit member, the organization was able to meet all its requirements, despite never having been fully mobilized in its entire history except for a few months during Operation Desert Storm.⁵⁹

Certainly the missions of the Air and Army National Guards are different and it is much easier to rotate pilots in and out of assignments than it is to swap land forces. There are, however, many similarities in some Army specialties. A doctor, for example, does not necessarily have to serve the entire six months of a rotation. Instead, he could possibly do a

fifteen or thirty day stint (or even a few of each) over the deployment period. There is no reason why a cook cannot be replaced with little impact on the operation. This case can, in fact, be made for the vast majority of specialties.

There are a couple of areas of concern with this method. A little more care would need to be taken when rotating combat forces. One danger in conducting individual rotations is that it could potentially harm the cohesion of the squad or platoon which has trained together and reached a high level of collective expertise. Individual replacement, however, has been occurring for years. By 1943 during World War II, the Army stopped establishing and training new divisions as a whole before shipping them to the front and began training individual replacements to fill holes in battle torn outfits.⁶⁰ There is no reason why this will not work in a peacetime deployment. Rotating a squad or platoon at a time could minimize this impact.

The unit leadership would need to be in place for longer periods to maintain command and control of the operation. It would be much more difficult to rotate commanders every few weeks or months than it would be to replace cooks or mechanics. However, if the organization has the mission for the duration, then six months no longer becomes a magic number. Some commanders and other unit leaders may want to, need to, or be able to stay longer. Some may need to leave earlier due to civilian work or for family reasons. If the leadership is rotated in and out on a staggered schedule then continuity is maintained and the unit as a whole continues to operate smoothly.

The cost of this type of operation will definitely increase, as will the amount of pre-deployment training. Obviously, it will cost more money to train and move more soldiers in and out of the mission area. These mission costs, however, need to be balanced against the costs of recruiting new soldiers. MG Podlowski stated that it cost \$60,000 to recruit and train a new soldier and that it was cheaper to pay for a plane ticket than have to train new soldiers.⁶¹ Certainly, a Guardsman who gets treated as well as possible according to his personal circumstances will be more likely stay in than one who is forced to go on a six month rotation that negatively impacts his business or job or family situation. It is far less expensive to retain good soldiers who are already trained, not to mention the added benefits of having a soldier who is familiar with the unit and already part of the team.

Individual pre-deployment training would have to be established on an ongoing basis either at the state or regional level. The advantage of having a single division in charge of a mission is that this training program could be controlled and managed internally. Scheduling could be as needed. This will definitely increase costs to a degree, but all of the states have some type of officer and enlisted school center with existing overhead already established. Thus, the added costs would primarily be for the additional cadre of that training program and the costs associated with the actual training.

SUMMARY

Great gains have been made in joining the Active and Reserve Components into one seamless force - The Army. From the early days in this country's history when the two were completely separate to today where there is an active partnership, there have been tremendous changes and improvements. This melding of forces, however, with the higher overseas participation demanded of the Army National Guard, needs to be managed carefully to preserve the traditions and viability of the Guard while meeting the country's military requirements. Significant steps must be taken immediately to mission all ARNG units. Force restructuring is essential to ensure that there are sufficient quantities of high-demand units available to spread deployment requirements and reduce the mission burden on specific units. Greater flexibility in deployments is necessary to reduce family and employer burdens on selected Guardsmen. With these actions, the Army National Guard will be more capable and effective in supporting ongoing peacekeeping operations, as well as being better able to perform its missions of support to the states during time of emergency and to the nation in time of war.

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